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ABSTRACT 
In this paper we construct an equilibrium model to formalize Coase's idea 
on the function of the firm in improving transaction efficiency. The relation­
ship between the division of labor, economic growth, and the evolution of ec­
onomic institutions are investigated. 
1 
AN APPROACH TO MODELING INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
I. Introduction 
This past year is the 50th anniversary of the publication of Coase's pa­
per [1937], "The Nature of the Firm." Coase's central thesis is that differ­
ences in transaction costs lead to the emergence of firms as a replacement for 
some markets. The institution of the firm can be used to take advantage of 
long-term contracts in order to save transaction costs. He argued that the 
division of labor and uncertainty are not major attributes of the firm because 
the division of labor can be organized by the market rather than by a firm and 
uncertainty can be used to justify a need for risk markets rather than for 
firms. 2 
The relationship between the emergence of the firm and the improvement of 
transaction efficiency has been reconsidered in many papers on this topic. 
Many authors extend and refine Coase's theory, e.g. Cheung [1982) and Alchian 
[1972). Cheung and Alchian hold that not only transaction costs but also the 
relationship between transaction costs and the division of labor is important 
1 I would like to thank Gene Grossman, Barry Nalebuff, Edwin Mills, T. N. 
Srinivasan, Raaj Sah for helpfull comments. Financial Supports from the 
Ford Foundation and the Open Society Fund are gratefully acknowledged. 
2 Kihlstrom and Laffont's model about uncertainty and the firm [1979) can be 
only used to justify a need for the risk market because the authors did not 
explain why wage contracts are more efficient than other market contract 
arrangements in trading uncertainty, e.g. insurance and stock trade in the 
markets. 
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for the emergence of the firm. Cheung points out that the growth of the firm 
may be viewed as the replacement of a product market by a factor market, re-
sulting in a savings in transaction costs. Alchian holds that there is a 
market within a firm. This market and the markets between firms and consumers 
may develop simultaneously. 
Some economists who follow the transaction-cost approach, e.g. William­
son [1985], hold that the neoclassical framework of utility and production 
functions is inappropriate for describing economic institutions. In contrast 
to this opinion, I hold that the neoclassical framework of utility and pro­
duction functions can be used to describe the evolution of institutions if the 
way that production function is specified is appropriately refined. 
Because most economists who follow the transaction-cost approach take the 
gains from trade as stemming only from comparative advantages, the relation­
ship between the evolution of the equilibrium level of division of labor and 
transaction efficiency cannot be well understood, although the relation be-
tween the firm and transaction costs has been discussed extensively. Such 
discussion will produce a partial view of the role of the firm and cannot shed 
light on the general relationship between the evolution of division of labor 
and the evolution of the institution of the firm. 
In Yang [1986], the different implications of transaction efficiency for 
economies with and without increasing returns to specialization are indicated. 
For an economy with comparative advantages and without increasing returns to 
specialization, the utility frontier defined by the Pareto optimum is consis­
tent with the production possibility frontier (PPF). But for an economy with 
increasing returns to specialization, the utility frontier may differ from the 
PPF because there exists a trade-off between increasing returns to speciali-
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zation and transaction costs. For such an economy, an improvement of trans­
action efficiency will move the utility frontier closer to the PPF and move 
equilibrium productivity closer to that associated with the PPF. If the con­
tract arrangement adopted by the firm can improve transaction efficiency, then 
such a contract arrangement may promote the equilibrium level of division of 
labor because this level is an increasing function of transaction efficiency. 
However, if the division of labor is based only on comparative advantage,. then 
the implications of improved transaction efficiency will not have effects of 
this sort. Then the impacts of transaction efficiency on the evolution of in­
stitutions is limited. This improvement will not lead to the progress of 
productivity and the evolution of institutions and the market system. 
Whereas most literature on the transaction-cost approach ignores increas­
ing returns to scale (IRS), many excellent studies of economic growth stemming 
from IRS, e.g. Romer [1986], Lucas [1986], Schultz [1986], Vassilakis [1986] 
ignore the importance of transaction costs in an economy with IRS. The liter­
ature thus cannot highlight the relationship between the evolution of division 
of labor and the evolution of the institution of the firm either. It appears 
to me that many recent excellent works in trade theory and growth theory have 
brought the division of labor based on increasing returns to specialization 
into a central place in economics. I believe that a combination of the trans­
action-cost approach and the models describing increasing returns to special­
ization may be meaningful for such a development and may shed light on the 
theory on economic growth, trade, and the evolution of market and economic 
institutions. 3 
Helpman and Krugman [1985] pointed out the importance of transaction costs 
for the model with IRS. However, in their model increasing returns to spe-
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3 
In an insightful paper, Sah and Stiglitz [1986] push the notion of spe­
cialization one step further. They point out: "the past half century has been 
marked not only by greater specialization in production, but also by greater 
specialization in learning." They propose a concept "localized learning" and 
argue that the hours spent learning are specific for each individual. This 
concept may be used to distinguish increasing returns to specialization from 
increasing returns to scale. 
Schultz [1986] and Lucas [1986] emphasize the importance of increasing 
returns to specialization for economic growth and note the intrinsic connec­
tion between increasing returns to specialization and so called "human capi­
tal". Schultz stresses the compatibility between increasing returns to spe-
cialization and decentralized markets. He holds that increasing returns to 
specialization are a general economic phenomena and the major function of 
specialization is to speed up the accumulation of knowledge (human capital). 
In this paper, I will combine the theories proposed by Sah, Stiglitz, Lu­
cas, and Schultz with the ideas of Coase, Cheung, and Alchian to achieve an 
equilibrium model based on micro-production functions with increasing returns 
to specialization and Cobb-Douglas utility functions. Using such a model, I 
will show that competitive equilibrium balances a trade-off between the econ­
omies of division of labor and transaction costs. Increasing transaction ef­
ficiency will lead to greater division of labor. The institution of the firm 
would increase the equilibrium level of the division of labor and productivity 
if it could be used to improve transaction efficiency. 
cialization are not distinguished from increasing returns to scale, so that 
the implications of increasing returns to specialization combined with 
transaction costs to institutional evolution was not addressed. 
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In section II, I present the model. In section III, I solve for the indi­
vidual decision problems. In section IV, I solve for the equilibrium and the 
Pareto optimum using a multiple-step approach. In section V, I derive compar­
ative statics of the model set out in the previous sections. Finally I make 
some remarks on this model. 
11 . The Model 
Let us consider an economy with M consumers/producers. There are two con­
sumer goods and one intermediate good (or service) in this economy. The self­
provided amount of the two consumer goods are x and y respectively. By self­
provided, we shall mean that quantity of a good produced by an individual for 
hls own use. The amounts of two consumer goods sold in the market are xs and 
s . 1y respective y. The amounts of two consumer goods purchased in the market 
are xd and yd respectively. An "iceberg" type of transaction technology is 
,characterized by the coefficient k. Fraction k of a shipment will disappear in 
d dtransaction. Thus, (1-k)x and (1-k)y are the amounts an individual receives 
from the purchases of the two consumer goods respectively. 
The amounts consumed of the two goods are x+(l-k)xd and y+(l-k)yd respec-
tively. The utility function is identical for all individuals and given by 
(II-1) 
This Cobb-Douglas utility function represents a preference for diverse con­
sumption. The amount consumed of each good cannot be zero. A combination of 
di.verse consumption and specialized production will base equilibrium on a 
trade-off between the gains from trade and transaction costs. 
There is a simple iso-elasticity production function for consumer goody: 
(II-2) y + ys = La a > 1 
y 
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where y + ys is the output level of goody and L is the hours used in pra­
y 
ducing this good. 
In producing x, we need intermediate good z. The production function for 
X is 
s d b(II-3a) X + X = {[z+(l-t)z ]L}
X 
d
where z is the amount of the intermediate good purchased from the market; the 
fraction t of zd disappears in transaction. Hence, (1-t)zd is the amount an 
individual receives from the purchase of this intermediate good. z is the 
amount self-provided of this good. L is the hours used in producing consumer 
X 
good x. Later we will see that the equilibrium number of firms is greater than 
one in the market with firms if 1/2 < b < 1 and this number is one if b ~ 1. 
b > 1/2 implies that there are increasing returns to specialization in pro­
ducing x. 
The production function of z is 
(II-3b) zs = Lc C ) 1 z 
where zs is the amount of the intermediate good sold and L is the hours used 
z 
in producing z 
In conjuction with individual constraints on labor endowments, 
(II-2)-(II-3) specify a system of production functions for an individual. 
Assume that an individual has L units of labor, then the labor endowment con­
straint for each individual is 
(II-4) L +L +L =L 
X y Z 
where some L. could be zero. For instance, L = L = 0, if an individual pro-
1 X y 
duces only z. This system of production functions is specified for a produc-
er/consumer rather than for the, firm. It exhibits increasing returns to spe­
cialization. According to this production function, each individual always 
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may choose to be self-provided in some goods. Based on the concept of local­
ized technology proposed by Sah and Stiglitz, we assume that "L" is specific 
for each individual. The maximal amount of this specific L for each individ­
ual is limited. This point distinguishes increasing returns to specialization 
from increasing returns to scale. The Mills' production function describes a 
positive relation between productivity and the level of specialization. 
The combination of increasing returns to specialization, exhibited by the 
Mills' production function, and individual preference for diverse consumption, 
will set up a trade-off between the gains from the division of labor and 
transaction costs. The market equilibrium will balance this trade-off. The 
improvement of transaction efficiency will raise this equilibrium level of 
division of labor. Such improvement may be caused either by progress of 
transaction technology or by institutional innovation. The latter case is 
where the setting of the firm may play its role. 
111. Individual Optimal Decisions 
I assume free entry for all individuals into any sector and a large M. 
These assumptions imply that individuals treat prices parametrically. 
As in Yang [1986], an individual must solve for a corner solution for 
each structure and his decision making process consists of two steps. In the 
first step, all structures are enumerated. An individual solves for the effi­
cient allocation (how much should be produced and traded of each good) for 
given prices and for each structure. In the second step, he decides what 
should be produced and what should be sold and purchased, i.e. which structure 
should be chosen. 
Following proposition 1 in Yang [1986], for the model with increasing re­
turns to specialization, an individual sells to the market only one type of 
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traded good (if any) and does not buy those goods he produces. Taking this 
point into account, there are seven structures which are candidates for the 
optimal structures. 
(1) Structure (x,y,z), i.e. an individual is completely self-sufficient. 
The decision problem for this structure is 
(III-1) Max: U = xy 
x,y,z,L ,L ,L
X y Z 
as.t. y = L (production functions)y 
L +L +L =L (endowment constraint)
X y Z 
Here and in the following six decision problems, we use the equivalence be-
u2. . . U d · · ·t ween maximizing an maximizing 
(2) Structure (x,z/y), i.e. an individual produces x and z, and buys y. 
The decision problem for this structure is 
(III-2) Max: U = xy d (1-k) 
d s x,y ,x ,z,L ,L
X Z 
s b LCs.t. X + X = [zL ] , z = (production functions)
X z 










and py are prices of x and y respectively. By Walras' law, we assume 
xis numeraire, px = 1 and py - p. 
(3) Structure (x/z, y) , i.e. an individual produces x and buys z and y. 
The decision problem for this structure is 
(III-3) Max: U = xyd(l-k) 
d s d x,y ,x ,z 
s d bs.t. x + x = [(1-t)z L] (production functions) 
s d d x = py + qz (trade balance) 
where q is the price of good z in terms of good x. 
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(4) Structure (z/x,y), i.e. an individual produces z and purchases x and 
y. The decision problem for this structure is 
d d 2(III-4) Max: u = X y (1-k) 
d d s 
X ,y ,z 
s.t. zs = Lc (production functions) 
s d d 
qz = x + PY (trade balance) 
(5) Structure (y/x), i.e. an individual produces y and buys x. The deci­
sion problem for this structure is 
(III-5) Max: U = yx d (1-k) 
d s y,x ,y 
s.t. y + y s = La (production functions) 
s d
PY = X (trade balance) 
The following two structures are exactly the same as structures (x/z,y) and 
(z/x,y) respectively except that the transaction method differs. 
(6) Structure (x/L,y), i.e. an individual becomes an employer, producing 
x and buying labor Landy. He purchases M L units of labor from the labor zx 
market and lets the workers specialize in the production of z. M =M /M is 
ZX Z X 
the relative number of workers producing z to employers selling x, or the 
number of workers hired by the employer. The decision problem for this 
structure is 
(III-6) Max: U = xy d (1-k) 
d s d x,y ,x ,z ,Mzx 
s.t. x + xs = [(1-t')MzxzdL]b, zd = [(1-t")L]c (production functions) 
s d x = py + wM L (budget constraint)zx 
where w is the wage rate in terms of good x. 1/t' is supervision efficiency 
within a firm; a fraction t' of output disappears in the production process 
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L 
because of the supervision costs. 1/t" is transaction efficiency in labor 
market; a fraction t" of labor service purchased by an employer disappears in 
labor trade. For simplicity, I let t' denote the transaction cost coefficient 
in supervising and trading labor and assume t" = 0. If b < 1, the optimal M 
zx 
is determined by the decision problem (III-6). If b ~ 1, the optimal M in zx 
problem (III-6) is infinitely great. For this case the equilibrium M is de­zx 
termined by free entry that maximizes the real returns to labor with respect 
to M zx 
(7) Structure (L/x,y), i.e. an individual becomes an employee, he sells 
-- labor and purchases x and y. The decision problem for this structure is 
(III-7) Max: U = xdyd(l-k) 2 
d d 
X ,y ' 
d ds.t. wL = x + py (budget constraint) 
From each one of these problems, I can solve for the optimal decisions 
including individual demand and individual supply for a given structure. In­
serting the optimal decisions into utility functions, I obtain indirect util­
ity functions, as functions of relative prices. They differ from structure to 
structure. 
IV. Equilibrium 
Due to the existence of increasing returns, there is a corner solution 
for each structure. By the combinations of these structures, we have several 
market structures. For each market structure, there is a candidate for equi­
librium. Such a candidate is an analogue of a corner solution. I call it a 
corner equilibrium. In subsection IV.A, I solve for the corner equilibrium for 
each market structure. In subsection IV. B, I solve for the Pareto optimum 
corner equilibrium. Finally, I identify full equilibrium among these corner 
equilibria and prove that it is the Pareto optimum. 
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IV .A The Market Structures 
From logically consistent combinations of the structures listed in the 
previous section, I can obtain four market structures, I will refer to them 
simply as "markets". These are 
(i) Autarky. All individuals choose structure (x,y,z). 
(ii) Partial division of labor in producing final goods, I refer to this 
market as P. This market is a combination of structure (x,z/y) and structure 
(y/x). 
(iii) Complete division of labor without firms, I refer to this market as 
C. This market is a combination of structures (x/z,y), (z/x,y) and (y/x). 
(iv) Complete division of labor with firms, I refer to this market as F. 
This market consists of structures (x/L,y), (L/x,y) and (y/x). 4 
It is easy to see that market F and market C have the same organizational 
structure of production and different transaction arrangements. Market F re­
places the transaction of intermediate goods in the market between individuals 
by the transactions of intermediate goods within a firm and trades of labor in 
the market. As Alchian and Cheung pointed out, a firm replaces the external 
market for products by an internal market for intermediate service within a 
firm and external market for factors. In other words, people can choose al­
ternative contractual arrangements in the external market to organize the di­
vision of labor and trade other than the wage contract associated with firms. 
It could be proven that other markets, e.g. a combination of autarky struc­
ture and another market or a combination of structure (x,z/y) and market C, 
cannot occur in equilibrium. Therefore, we are not concerned with them. A 




We should explain why the wage contract supersedes other alternative contract 
arrangements and cannot just take the institution of the firm as given. 
Let the number of individuals selling good (or factor) i be M.; I can ob-
1 
tain aggregate demand (or supply) in a given market by multiplying M. with 
1 
individual demand for (or supply of) good i. Because the total number of all 
individuals is a constant M, we need solve only for the relative numbers of 
individuals choosing different structures. That is, I can solve M from tM. = 
S 1 
M if I know all other M. (i ~ s).
1 
Letting aggregate demand equal aggregate supply, we have the market 
clearing conditions in a given market. Free entry will make the utilities in 
different structures equal to one another. 
For market P, for example, the market clearing condition is 
s d(IV-la) M X = M X 
X y 
and the utility equalization condition is 
d d(IV-lb) xy (1-k) = yx (1-k) 
where M is the number of individuals choosing structure (x,z/y) and M is the 
X y 
number of individuals choosing structure (y/x) and M+ M = M. 
X y 
For a given market, if we haven traded goods, then we have n-1 indepen-
dent market clearing conditions and n-1 relative prices of traded goods. If a 
market includes m structures, then we have m-1 utility equalization conditions 
and m-1 relative numbers of individuals choosing different structures. From 
direct calculation, we can show th-at there is a unique corner equilibrium for 
each one of the four markets. A corner equilibrium is defined by n-1 corner 
equilibrium relative prices and m-1 corner equilibrium relative numbers of 
individuals choosing different structures. The corner equilibria in the four 
markets are the candidates for equilibrium. 
V. B The Pareto Optimum Corner Equilibrium 
-12-
L 
For a given market, I can construct a problem to solve for the restricted 
Pareto optimal allocation. By "restricted", I shall mean that the market 
structure is given. In this problem, I maximize the utility in a structure 
with respect to the quantities of all goods and subject to production func­
tions, the balance between the total consumption and total production of each 
good, and the condition that the utilities in other structures are not less 
than some constants. By manipulating the algebra, it is easy to prove that 
each corner equilibrium found in the previous subsection is a restricted Par­
eto optimal allocation. Comparing all corner equilibrium utilities in differ­
ent markets, I will identify the corner equilibrium with maximum utility. 
define such a corner equilibrium as the Pareto optimum corner equilibrium. It 
is easy to see that this corner equilibrium satisfies the necessary conditions 
for the Pareto optimum. Here the Pareto optimum is defined similarly to the 
restricted Pareto optimal allocation, except that there is no constraint im­
posed on the choice of market. 
From direct calculation and comparison of the corner equilibrium utili-
ties in four markets, I can show the following proposition 
P ropos ition 1 
For b < 1, we have that 
(1) Complete division of labor without firms (market C) is the Pareto op­
timum corner equilibrium if f(t,k) < g(b, c) and t < t', where f(t,k) = 
-ln(l-t)-ln(l-k)l/Z, g = lnb+(l/b-l)ln(l-b)+cln(l+l/c)+bln(l+c), at/at> 0, 
af/ak > o, ag/ab > o and ag/ac > o. 
(2) Complete division of labor with firms (market F) is the Pareto opti­
mum corner equilibrium if f(t', k) < g(b, c) and t' < t. 
-13- · 
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(3) Autarky is the Pareto optimum corner equilibrium if k > 1-h(a,b,c), 
where h(a,b,c) = 4[b(l+c)]b(l+c)aa/[b(l+c)+a]b(l+c)+a, ah/aa < O, ah/ab < O, 
and ah/ac < o. 
(4) Partial division of labor (market P) is the Pareto optimum corner 
equilibrium if f(t, k) > g(b ,c), f(t' ,k) > g(b ,c) and k < 1-h(a,b ,c). 5 
In other words, if transaction efficiency is great, then the Pareto opti­
mum corner equilibrium is associated with a high level of division of labor 
and if transaction efficiency in the labor market and supervision efficiency 
within firms are sufficiently greater than transaction efficiency in the mar­
ket for intermediate goods, then the Pareto optimum corner equilibrium is as­
sociated with the market including firms. 
IV .C Equilibrium and the Pareto Optimum. 
In this subsection, I prove 
Proposition 2 
For the model set out in the previous subsections, the equilibrium is the 
Pareto optimum. 
In order to establish this proposition, it suffices to 
(i) show that the Pareto optimum corner equilibrium is an equilibrium; 
and 
(ii) show that all non-Pareto optimum corner equilibria are not equilib-
ria. 
If b ~ 1, f(t,k) and g(b,c) will be changed, the major conclusion will, 




It is easy to show (i) because the Pareto optimum corner equilibrium en­
sures a full maximization of utility for each individual and all local equi­
libria satisfy all the necessary conditions for full equilibrium except for 
ensuring the full maximization of individual utilities. 
To prove (ii), we must "break" all non-Pareto optimum corner equilibria. 
Assume that f(t,k) < g(b,c), i.e. the complete division of labor (market C) is 
an equilibrium and the Pareto optimum and other markets have non-Pareto opti­
mum corner equilibria. For example, for local equilibrium in market P (the 
partial division of labor), there are corner equilibrium prices p, q and cor­
ner equilibrium utility U(P). All individuals know that they can choose any 
one of seven structures. Each individual can insert the corner equilibrium 
prices p and q of market Pinto indirect utilities of the structures in market 
C. If these utilities are greater than U(P), then individuals have incentives 
to break corner equilibrium in market P under corner equilibrium prices in 
market P. 
In market C, there are three structures. The indirect utility functions 
in the three structures are 
(IV-2a) u = GI X pq2b/(1-b) X 
(IV-2b) u = GyPy 
2(IV-2c) u = G q /pz z 
where U , U , and U are indirect utility functions for structures (x/z,y),X y Z 
(y/x), and (z/x,y) respectively. G. is constant depending on L, k, t, a, b,
1 
and c. 
Let p' and q' be equilibrium prices in market C; we have utility equali­
zation conditions in market C: 
(IV-3) 
--15- • 
where U(C) is a constant depending on all parameters. Recalling that U(P) is 
corner equilibrium utility in market P; the assumption that market C is Pareto 
optimum corner equilibrium implies that U(C) > U(P). 
Individuals will compare the utilities in the structures of market Cun­
der prices of market P, i.e. Ux(p,q), Uy(p), and Uz(p,q) with U(P). If any 
one of the following inequalities holds, then individuals have incentives to 
shift to a structure of market C from market P under the prices in market P, 
i.e., market Pis broken. 
(IV-4a) Ux(p,q) > U(P) 
(IV-4b) u (p) ) U(P)y 
(IV-4c) Uz(p,q) > U(P) 
Note, here we are in a Walrasian regime, each individual choosing a structure 
for given prices and not concerned with the behavior of other individuals. 
Because U(C) > U(P), one semi-inequality in (IV-4) will hold if one semi-ine­
quality in (IV-5) holds. 
(IV-5a) U (p,q) ~ U (p' ,q') = U(C)
X X 
(IV-5b) U (p) ~ U (p') = U(C)y y 
(IV-5c) U (p,q) ~ U (p' ,q') = U(C)z z 
where the equalities are based on the utility equalization condition (IV-3). 
(IV-4) and (IV-5) imply that if U.(p,q) ~ U.(p',q') = U(C), then U.(p,q) > 
1 1 1 
U(P) since U(C) > U(P). Concretely, (IV-5) is 
(IV-6a) Gx/pq2b/(1-b) ~ Gx/p'q'2b/(1-b) 
(IV-6b) Gyp~ GyP' 
2 2(IV-6c) Gzq /p ~ Gzq' /p' 
It is easy to see that in (IV-6) at least one semi-inequality must hold for 
any p, q and p', q'. This implies that individuals have incentives to shift to 
· -16-
at least one structure in market C from market P under corner equilibrium 
prices in P. That is, the non-Pareto optimum corner equilibrium in market Pis 
not full equilibrium. 
Repeating this procedure, we can break any of the other non-Pareto opti­
mum corner equilibrium. Therefore, proposition 2 has been proven. 
Propositions 1 and 2 imply that complete division of labor without firms 
(market C) is an equilibrium (and also the Pareto optimum) if transaction ef­
ficiencies 1/t and 1/k and/or the extent of increasing returns to specializa­
tion in producing intermediate goods are sufficiently great relative to the 
extent of increasing returns to specialization in producing final goods. If 
the extent of increasing returns to specialization and/or transaction effi­
ciency are sufficiently small, then equilibrium and the Pareto optimum are 
autarky. For intermediate increasing returns to specialization and trans­
action efficiencies, the equilibrium and the Pareto optimum are the partial 
division of labor (market P). If transaction efficiency of intermediate goods 
within a firm and transaction efficiency in labor market are sufficiently 
great relative to transaction efficiency of intermediate goods in external 
market and the complete division of labor is Pareto superior to less division 
of labor, then equilibrium is associated with the market with firms. In other 
words, we have 
.Corollary 1 
Increasing transaction efficiency and/or increasing extent of the econo­
mies of specialization will lead to a greater equilibrium (and Pareto optimal) 
level of division of labor. Moreover, equilibrium will be associated with the 
market including firms if supervision efficiency within firms and transaction 
efficiency in labor market are sufficiently greater than transaction efficiency 
in the market for intermediate goods. 
-17-
This corollary has answered the question why firms substitute the exter­
nal market for intermediate goods with the internal markets for intermediate 
goods within a firm and the external markets for labor. Furthermore, if 
f(t,k) > g(b,c) (market Pis Pareto superior to market C) and f(t' ,k) < g(b,c) 
(market Fis Pareto superior to market P), then the equilibrium will be market 
P (involving no division of labor in intermediate goods) and is not the Pareto 
optimum when there are no firms. The equilibrium will involve such division of 
labor and is Pareto optimum if firms are set up. This brings us to 
Corollary 2 
If transaction efficiency in labor market and supervision efficiency within 
firms are sufficiently greater than transaction efficiency in the market for in­
termediate goods and market P is Pareto superior to market C, i.e. market C 
(without firms) is not equilibrium, then the institutional innovation of firms 
will increase the level of division of labor and improve productivity and gen­
eral welfare. 
These two corollaries imply that the evolution of the division of labor 
in roundabout production (intermediate goods or services) and improvement of 
transaction efficiency are two sides of the rationale for the institution of 
the firm. Moreover, the emergence of the firm may increase the level of divi­
sion of labor thereby increasing the total transaction cost although the firm 
will improve transaction efficiency if the benefits from the finer division of 
labor outweigh the increased transaction costs. 
V. Comparative Statics 
In this subsection, we will first discuss the comparative statics within 
a given market, then discuss the comparative statics across market structures. 
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Assume that equilibrium is associated with market F and all parameters 
may change under constraint f(t',k) < g(b,c). Then we will obtain the compar­
ative statics within the market by manipulating the eq~ilibrium conditions. 
(1) The ratio of intermediate products to final products characterizes 
the "roundaboutness" of production in an economy. This roundaboutness will 
increase with the extent of increasing returns to specialization. Formally, 
s slet the ratio be R = M wL/(M x +M__py ), where M, M, and M are the numbers 
Z X y- X y Z 
of individuals choosing structures (x/z,y), (y/x), and (z/x,y) respectively. 
s sMzwL is the total value of intermediate good z and Mxx +M~y is the total 
trade value of final goods. Then we have 
(V-1) aR/ab > o, if 3Ll-b > blnL-1 R = 2b/(3-b+Lb-l). 
From the U. S. input-output tables, I can obtain data on the roundaboutness. 
These data indicate a significant increase in the roundaboutness over time. 
The ratio of values of intermediate goods to consumer goods are .44 in 1947, 
.54 in 1958, .55 in 1961, .57 in 1963, .62 in 1967 (see Department of Commerce 
[1975]). 
(2) Assume that good z is a machine or other capital good; the capital­
labor ratio in our model increases as transaction efficiency is improved. Let 
this ratio S = M wL/ML; we have z 
(V-2) as/at' < o, as/ak < o, as;ac > o, as/ab> o 
where M wL is the total output value of intermediate (capital) goods, ML is z 
the total quantity of labor, and 
S = [bl+b(l-b)l-b(l-t)b (1-k)b/2Lb(c+l)-1]/[3-2b+b(l-k)l/2]. 
(3) The number of workers hired by an employer, M =M /M increases as 
ZX Z X 
the extent of increasing returns to specialization, "b" and transaction effi-
ciency, 1/k, i.e. 
2
(V-3) M = b(l-k) 1/ /(l-b) and aM ;ab> o, aM /ak < o. zx zx zx 
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The algebra to show (II-7)-(II-9) is in the Appendix. For different mar­
kets, I can solve for corner equilibrium ratios of intermediate products to 
final products, corner equilibrium ratios of capital to labor, and of trade 
volume to income. By comparing these ratios in different markets and using the 
corollaries 1 and 2, we can obtain other results on the comparative statics 
across market structures. 6 From direct calculation, we can show that the three 
ratios will increase as the market evolves from autarky to the developed di­
vision of labor and this evolution may be induced by an improved transaction 
efficiency and/or an increased extent of increasing returns to specialization. 
The emergence of firms will be related to this evolution of market structure 
if the institution of the firm can be used to improve transaction efficiency. 
If I specify production functions for many intermediate activities, then 
equilibrium may be associated with new firms specializing in finer subprofes­
sions of intermediate activities if the gains from finer division of labor and 
from the decrease in transaction costs among subprofessions within such firms 
equal the increase in transaction costs between such firms and other firms at 
the margin. The institutional and technical innovations facilitating the im­
provement of transaction efficiency will shift equilibrium to a increasingly 
finer division of labor in intermediate activities. Such evolution of market 
structure and the institution of the firm will increase the capital-labor ra­
tio in the whole economy. Therefore, the increase in the capital-labor ratio 
is not only a matter of technical conditions and available inputs, but also a 
matter of the evolution of the market and firm structure. 
VI. Remarks on the Model 
More general analysis on the comparative statics across markets can be 
found in Yang [1986] . 
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6 
Such a model has several merits. 
(1) Primary production functions are relevant to individuals and each in­
dividual is able to produce any good. The prices are determined by the number 
of individuals choosing different structures, while free entry prevents any 
individual from manipulating these numbers. Therefore, there is no monopoly 
power in the market even though the equilibrium number of actual producers for 
a good may be small if the equilibrium is associated with a high level of di­
vision of labor. In other words, increasing returns to specialization is com­
patible with a Walrasian regime. In our model, a decentralized market can in­
tegrate increasing returns to specialization (internal to individuals) into 
the economies of the division of labor (external to individuals). 
Moreover, Mills' production function is relevant to the relation between 
productivity and economic organization rather than to technology itself. This 
production function distinguishes increasing returns to specialization from 
the increasing returns to scale and the gains to trade based on comparative 
advantages. Therefore, our model based on the Mills' production function can 
be used to highlight the relation between the evolution of economic institu­
tion, the division of labor, and economic growth. 
(2) For market F the individual production functions in structures 
(x/L,y,z) and (L/x,y) are aggregated into a production function of the firm. 
This aggregate production function looks like the conventional production 
function associated with U-shaped average cost curves (if b < 1) or that with 
global increasing returns to scale (if b ~ 1). However, the conventional pro­
duction function is irrelevant to the decision problem of the optimal level of 
self-sufficiency and in fact our individual production function differs from 
the production function associated with U-shaped average cost curves or that 
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with global increasing returns to scale. Our model can be used to explain a 
simultaneous evolution of the division of labor, the market, and the firm. 
The evolution looks like a shift of the structure of production functions 
since new traded goods, new professions, and new firms will come to being and 
productivity will be improved as the division of labor and market evolve. 
From direct calculation, we can show that the trade volume of final goods 
in the market is greater in market F than in market P if f(t',k) < g(b,c). 
This implies that the evolution of the division of labor from market P to 
market F not only increases the exchange volume of intermediate service (or 
goods) within a firm, but also increases the trade volume of final goods in 
the market. This supports Alchian's idea about a simultaneous development of 
the firm and market. 
In the equilibrium of market F, the number of workers hired by an entre­
preneur is M /M, an increasing function of transaction efficiency 1/k, where 
Z X 
M is the number of workers producing z in firms and M is the number of em-z X 
ployers. This implies that an improvement of transaction efficiency will in-
crease the equilibrium level of division of labor, thereby increasing the 
equilibrium number of workers hired by an entrepreneur and the equilibrium 
scale of the firm. 7 
For great supervision efficiency within a firm and transaction efficiency 
in the market for labor, relative to transaction efficiency in the market for 
intermediate goods, propositions 1 and 2 tell us that equilibrium is associ­
ated with the institution of the firm. However, these two propositions mean 
In Vassilakis [1986], a model with increasing returns to scale is used to 
justify the increase in the worker~employer ratio based on the evolution of 
the division of labor. 
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7 
that equilibrium will shift to corner equilibrium with the market for inter­
mediate goods from one with firms if transaction efficiency in the market for 
intermediate goods is sufficiently improved relative to supervision efficiency 
within firms and transaction efficiency in labor market. In other words, 
whether individual professions are integrated into a firm or a firm disinte­
grated into separate professions depends upon the difference between trans­
action efficiencies in markets F and C. 
(3) In this paper I adopt a multiple-step approach to solving for the 
equilibrium. This approach is flexible enough to accommodate different hier­
archical structures of the firm and transaction network. For example, I can 
specify a transaction network associated with piece rate contracts in the firm 
and a transaction network associated with subcontract arrangements in the 
market, then I solve for two corner equilibria. The corner equilibrium utili­
ties in the two market structures will be different because of the different 
transaction efficiencies of these transaction networks. Investigating the 
comparative statics, I can see under what condition equilibrium will shift 
from a corner equilibrium to another one. Also, this multiple-step approach 
can be used to extend the model in this paper to contain many final and in­
termediate goods and many roundabout professions in the division of labor. 
This multiple-step approach simulates a searching process for the Pareto 
optimum by a trial-and-error method. In reality, this process not only 
searches for a Pareto optimal allocation of resources for a given market 
structure, but also searches for a Pareto optimal structure of the firm and 
market. 
If we interpret z as the management services required in producing good x 
and assume that the individual producing z may set up a firm by hiring the 
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8 
individuals producing x, then we can show that equilibrium will be associated 
with the institution of the firm when the transaction efficiency in labor 
trade is sufficiently greater than the transaction efficiency in trade of 
management services. 
The model of this sort differs from that without management services. In 
the model without management service, goods are tangible commodities. But 
management services· in the revised model is intangible knowledge property, 
which is usually in the form of know-how. For such models, we will have prob­
lems of information. 
Indeed, in the model without management problem, there implicitly is a 
problem of information. In our model, the original system of production func­
tions is identical for all individuals. However, if people specialize in the 
production of different goods and/or have different levels of specialization, 
productivities of various goods will differ from individual to individual in 
equilibrium, i.e. there are comparative advantages in production based on in­
creasing returns to specialization. 8 Such comparative advantages based on in­
creasing returns to specialization imply that an individual specializing in a 
certain production process knows more about this process than the individuals 
specializing in other production processes. In fact, the gains from trade in 
such a model are based on the difference in knowledge possessed by individuals 
When there is no increasing returns to specialization, if production func­
tion is identical for all people, productivities of all goods in equilibri­
um will be identical for all people. The discussion on the distinction of 
comparative advantage based on increasing returns to specialization from 




specializing in different professions. However, in the model without manage­
ment problem, individuals do not directly trade knowledge. They trade tangible 
goods or service which embody the specific information on how to efficiently 
produce them (implicitly represented by prices). In the revised model, indi­
viduals may directly trade management knowledge in the market place. But the 
intangible commodity, like all other commodities of this sort has serious 
problem of transaction. First, it is'extremely difficult to delimit the rights 
to contract for such intangible commodities because of prohibitively great 
cost of keeping an owner's exclusive property rights over such commodities. 
Second, the costs of enforcing the payments from those individuals having used 
management knowledge to the owner of the knowledge are extremely great because 
of the existence of "spill-over". 9 
There are three ways to address the problem of intangible commodity: (1) 
There is no market for the intangible commodity because the rights to con­
tract on the commodity cannot be delimited. (2) There is no market for the 
intangible commodity because pricing costs (costs of metering the quantity 
traded, costs of finding price, and costs of collecting payment) are pro­
hibitively great. (3) In the market, allocation of the intangible commodity 
is not efficient because of externalities. Essentially, these three ways 
are closely related to one another. For example, we can say that the rights 
to contract cannot be delimited because of great pricing costs. Or we can 
say that there are externalities because there is no the market for the in­
tangible goods (pollution or some knowledge), while the lack of the markets 
is due to transaction costs that are too large. The relation and distinc­
tion among these three methods needs to be clarified in further research. 
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In other words, pricing costs of management knowledge in a market are so 
high that a market for management services is sometimes almost infeasible. 
Hence, using the revised model it is easy to show that the equilibrium in the 
division of labor between producing intangible management knowledge and tan­
gible goods involves the institution of the firm and a market for labor rather 
than a market for management service. The function of the institution of the 
firm is thus to replace the market for management knowledge or other intangi­
ble commodities (e.g. organizational structure of large corporation itself is 
a kind of property) with the market for labor or other tangible commodities 
(e.g. other factors or the large corporation itself) in order to avoid ex­
tremely great transaction costs in the developed division of labor between the 
production of intangible property and the production of tangible commodity. 10 
Such replacement is a common economic phenomenon. For example, TV sta­
tions replace trading of information between TV program producers and their 
audience with trading among advertisement agents, the TV stations, and the 
customers of the TV program and goods advertised by the agents. This is be­
cause pricing efficiency in the latter trade is much greater than in the for­
mer trade. It is expensive to monitor who watches which TV program and to 
collect payments from each viewer. Therefore, the latter trade may be Pareto 
superior to· the former though everybody knows that the latter trade causes 
some distortion by forcing the audience to watch advertisements that they 
might prefer not to see. 
10 The market for labor has a similar (moral hazard) problem: transaction 
costs to specify the quality of labor, i.e. effort, are great. Hence, the 
institution with relatively less serious problem of transaction cost will 
be prefered. 
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In other words, the institution of the firm may be used to efficiently 
protect intangible knowledge property and improve its pricing efficiency. In 
particular, the trade of the firms themselves (e.g. sale of a large corpora­
tion) can efficiently delimit the exclusive rights to contract over intangible 
property of management knowledge. 
According to the theory produced by a model of this sort, any. tax on 
trade (domestic and international) is harmful to economic growth and general 
welfare. Such a tax will decrease transaction efficiency and thereby decrease 
the equilibrium level of division of labor. But this theory by no means im­
plies that all governments that taxing their residents are irrational. The 
theory in this thesis can in fact be used to justify taxation. Because gov­
ernments produce many intangible commodities and the transaction efficiency 
for such commodities is extremely low, we need taxation to finance the pro­
duction of such intangible properties. 
If the firm is not available as an institution and the market for manage­
ment services involves transaction costs that are too great, then there does 
not exit an equilibrium with a complete division of labor. The individuals 
who produce goods and need the management knowledge will be free riders and 
nobody will be willing to specialize in management. So called "market failure" 
will occur. In this sense, the institution of the firm can be used to overcome 
this "market failure." However, the firm is a type of market system. It re­
places the market for management services by the markets for factors and in­
ternal market within firms. In this sense, the function of the firm is to re­
place deficient markets by efficient ones. 
Indeed, there is an almost unlimited number of feasible institutional ar­
rangements if the products are many and the division of labor in roundabout 
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activities is developed. The function of a decentralized market in searching 
for the efficient institutions and market structures may be much more impor­
tant than its function in allocating resources within a certain institution 
and market structure. 
Conclusions 
In this paper, we formalize Coase's notion of the role of the firm. The 
basic approach here is a typically neoclassical one of utility and production 
functions. However, in specifying production function, we emphasize the con­
cept of localized technology, proposed by Sah and Stiglitz [1986]. A produc­
tion function is specified for individuals and labor is specific for each in­
dividual. For traditional production functions, employers just put labor and 
other factors into "production functions" and obtain output from such black 
boxes. What is the internal organization of the black box, what implications 
does the internal organization have for the traditional theory of equilibrium, 
and why does an economy evolve from autarky without firms to one with the de­
veloped division of labor within firms and among the firms? The model in this 
paper allow us to open the black box and to answer these questions. 
In our model, the function of the firm is not only to put input factors 
into the black box of the production function and to pick up outputs from the 
black box, but also to organize the individuals' production functions into a 
combined one, which may have greater productivity than the combination of 
these individual production functions in. the market without firms. This is 
because the institution of the firm may be used to improve transaction effi­
ciency, thereby increasing the equilibrium level of the division of labor. 
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Based on the theory of firms formalized in this paper, we can show that 
all the results concerning trade and economic growth derived from the models 
with increasing returns to specialization in Yang [1986] and [1987] continue 
to hold when firms are introduced. 
Combining the approach in this paper with the approach to the dynamic 
model in Yang [1987b], we can show that the division of labor evolves over 
time even if there is not exogenous progress in transaction efficiency. 
Whether this evolution involves the institution of the firm depends on the 
relative extent of increasing returns to specialization in trading labor to 
that in trading intermediate goods. 
The most important result of this paper concerns two functions of the 
free market system (free price system and free enterprise system) beside its 
function in allocating resources for a given level of division of labor (mar­
ket structure) and a given institutional arrangement. The first one of these 
two functions is to search for the efficient level of division of labor (mar­
ket structure). The second one is to search for the efficient institutional 
arrangements. 
Accordingly, we find three types of distortions that can result from in­
appropriate government intervention: (i) The distortion of resource allocation 
for given levels of division of labor and institutional arrangement. This is 
the major concern of the traditional microeconomics. (ii) The distortion of 
organizational structure. (iii) The distortion of institutional arrangements. 
For example, if a government places a tax on business sales at proper rates 
such that relative prices do not deviate from efficient ones, then the tax 
will not cause allocative distortion. However, such a tax will increase 
transaction costs in the market for management services, thereby causing the 
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equilibrium to have a lower level of division of labor than without such a 
tax. Moreover, such a tax favours the institution of the firm and the market 
for labor over the market for management services. Hence, the equilibrium in­
stitutional arrangement may deviate from the efficient one if the efficient 
one is in fact the market for management services. 
Appendix The Algebra to Show Proposition 1 and Comparative Statics 
In this appendix, I first present the algebra to solve for corner equi­
libria in four markets one by one. Then I present the algebra of comparative 
statics in market F. 
(1) First, I consider marekt A. This marekt consists of one structure 
(x,y,z). The decision problem for this structure is given in (III-1). The 
optimal decisions of (III-1) are 
(1-1) L = bL/(bc+b+a) L = aL/(bc+b+a) L = bcL/(bc+b+a)
X y z 
az = Lc x = (zL )b y = L U = xy
Z X y A 
(2) In marekt P there are two structures (x,z/y) and (y/x). The deci­
sion problem for structure (x,z/y) is given in (III-2). The optimal decisions 
in this structure are 
s d d(2-1) L = L/(c+l) L = cL/(c+l) X = X = PY U = xy (1-k)X z X 
where pis the price of yin terms of x. 
The decision problem for structure (y/x) is given in (III-5). The opti-
mal decisions in this structure are 
d(2-2) L = L y = x /p = La/2 U = yx d (1-k)y y 
Let Ux = Uy' I obtain the utility equalization condition in market P which 
gives corner equilibrium price 
(2-3) 




(3) In marekt C, there are three structures (x/z,y), (z/x,y), and (y/x). 
The decision problem for structure (x/z,y) is given in (III-3). The optimal 
decisions in this structure are 
(3-1) U = xy d (1-k)
X 
where q is the price of z in terms of x. 
The decision problem for structure (z/x,y) is given in (III-4). The opti­
mal decisions in this structure are 
d d C d d 2(3-2) x = PY = qL /2 u = X y (1-k)z 
The optimal decisions in structure (y/x) are given by (2-2). Let U = U 
X y 
= U, the utility equalization conditions give the corner equilibrium pricesz 
in marekt C. 
(3-3) p = Lbc+b-a(l-k)b/2bb(l- b)l-b(l-t)b 
q = Lb-c+cb(l-k)(b-1)/2bb(l- b)l-b(l-t)b 
Inserting (3-3) into U, I find the real returns to labor in market C 
(3-4) 
Note, here I assume that b < 1. 
(4) In marekt F, there are three structures (x/L,y), (L/x,y), and (y/x). 
The decision problem for structure (x/z,y) is given in (III-6). The optimal 
decisions in this structure are 
U = xy d (1-k)
X 
where M is the relative number of employees to employers and w is the pricezx 
of labor in terms of x. 
The decision problem for structure (L/x,y) is given in (III-7). The opti­
mal decisions in this structure are 
d d d d 2(4-2) x = PY = wL/2 u
L 
= X y (1-k) 
-31-
The optimal decisions in structure (y/x) are given by (2-2). Let U = U 
X y 
= UL' the utility equalization conditions give the corner equilibrium prices 
in marekt F. 
(4-3) 
Inserting (4-3) into U, I find the real returns to labor in market F 
(4-4) 
Comparing UA in (1-1), UP in (2-4), UC in (3-4), and UF in (4-4), I ob­
tain proposition 1. 
Next, I present the algebra of comparative statics in market F. Accord­
ing to (II-7), the roundaboutness in market Fis defined as 
s s s s(5-1) R = M wL/(M x +M__py) = M wL/(x +M py)
Z X y- ZX yx 
where M. is the number of individuals producing good i and M.. is the relative 
1 1J 
number of individuals producing good i to individuals producing good j. The 
numerator of (5-1) is the total value of intermediate products and denominator 
is the total value of consumer goods. Here, wand pare given by (4-3). In­
serting w given by (4-3) into M given in (4-1), I find zx 
(5-2) 
From the marekt clearing condition for goody 
d d s(5-3) My +MyL=My
XX Z y 
where y~ is the quantity of y demanded by individuals producing good i, the 
1 
quantity and ys are given by the individual optimal decisions, I find 
(5-4) 
Inserting the value of pin (4-3) and the value of M in (5-2) into (5-4), I zx 
can obtain the value of M 
yx 
Inserting the values of w, p, and M. into (5-1), I find 
1X 
(5-5) 
It is not difficult to drive (II-7) from (5-5). 
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According to (V-2), the capital-labor ratio is defined as 
(5-6) S = MwL/ML = MwL/(M +M +M )L = M w/(l+M +M )
Z Z X Z y ZX ZX yx 
where numerator is the total value of capital (intermediate) goods and the 
denominator is the total amount of labor. w is given by (4-3), M and M are . zx yx 
given by (5-2) and (5-4) respectively. Therefore, I can derive Sin (V-2) from 
(5-6), (4-3), (5-2), and (5-4). 
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